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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
HARRY JAMAR GORDANf
:

Case No. 890130-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.
INTRODUCTION
This case in an interlocutory appeal from a district
court order indicating that the district court had no
jurisdiction to quash the bindover order issued by the circuit
court.
In support of the trial court's ruling, the State makes
three primary claims: 1) a motion to quash a bindover order is
an appeal in disguise; 2) the district courts have no appellate
jurisdiction over bindover orders; and 3) the interlocutory
appeal process is the most efficient route to resolving motions
to quash.
Appellant contests these assertions, as follows:
I.
BINDOVER QUASHAL IS NOT
STRICTLY AN APPELLATE FUNCTION.
It is apparently obvious to the State that a motion to
quash a bindover is actually a masquerading appeal.

Three

times, without supporting authority, the State argues to that
effect:
This type of on-the-record review of the
1

sufficiency of the evidence with the
requested relief being reversal of the order
reviewed can be nothing other than appellate
review.
Respondent's brief at 3.
As stated more fully above, what defendant
sought from the distirict court was review of
the circuit court record and a determination
by the district court that the record was
insufficient to support the order. This is
nothing other than appellate review.
Respondent's brief at 6.
Original jurisdiction is the authority of a
court to hear matters originally filed in
that court. Appellate jurisdiction is the
authority of a court to review orders of
other tribunals.
Respondent's brief at 6.
Appellant first notes that appellate jurisdiction
functions and original jurisdiction functions are not as clearly
distinguishable as the State believes.

Note that the

jurisdiction of the district courts which the State characterizes
as the district courts' "appellate jurisdiction" (Respondent's
brief at 4 ) , includes provisions for trials de novo in the
district courts.

See also Utah Code Ann. section 78-4-5

("The

circuit court has appellate jurisdiction to hear trials de novo
1
Utah Code Ann. section 78-3-4(5) provides district
courts with jurisdiction over agency adjudicative proceedings:
The district court has jurisdiction to review
agency adjudicative proceedings as set forth in
Chapter 46b# Title 63, and shall comply with the
requirements of that chapter, in its review of agency
adjudicative proceedings.
Section 63-46b-15(1)(a) provides
The district courts shall have jurisdiction to
review by trial de novo all final agency actions
resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings.
2

of the judgments of the justices1 courts and trials de novo of
the small claims department of the circuit court.").
Just as an appellate court may perform functions that
might ostensibly be characterized as trial functions, so may a
trial court perform during the exercise of its original
jurisdiction functions which might ostensibly be characterized as
appellate functions.

E.g. State v. Lesley, 672 P.2d 79, 82

(1983)(recognizing that a trial court might effectively reverse a
co-equal court's ruling that was based on inadequate information).
Appellant maintains that a motion to quash a bindover
may be disposed of during the district court *s exercise of
original jurisdiction.

Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(1)

provides, in part,
The following shall be raised at least five
days prior to trial:
(1) defenses and objections
based on defects in the indictment
or information other than that it
fails to show jurisdiction in the
court or to charge an offense,
which objection shall be noticed by
the court at any time during the
proceedingC.]
The State contends that this provision does not refer
to motions to quash bindovers based upon an inadequate showing
of probable cause, but pertains solely to typographical and other
2
technical errors in informations.
However, Rule of Criminal
Procedure 7 indicates that after a preliminary hearing, a
magistrate either shall find that the probable cause showing is

2

Respondent's brief at 7.
3

adequate and issue an order binding the defendant over to
district court, or shall find that the probable cause showing is
3
inadequate and dismiss the information.
Thus, a lack of
probable cause to support the bindover order renders the

4

information subject to attack under Rule 12, supra.

Cf. e.g.

State v. Smith, 617 P.2d 232 (Okl.Cr. 1980)(affirming district
court's "order quashing the information" based on insufficient
evidence presented at preliminary hearing).
Even if this were not the case, Rule 10 of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure contemplates that the district court
dispose of all objections relating to the preliminary hearing
3

Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 7 provides in part,
(8) (b) If from the evidence a magistrate
finds probable cause to believe that the
crime charged has been committed and that the
defendant has committed it, the magistrate
shall order, in writing, that the defendant
be bound over to answer in the district
court. The findings of probable cause may be
based on hearsay in whole or in part.
Objections to evidence on the ground that it
was acquired by unlawful means are not
properly raised at the preliminary
examination.
(c) If the magistrate does not find
probable cause to believe that the crime
charged has been committed or that the
defendant committed it, the magistrate shall
dismiss the information and discharge the
defendant. The magistrate may enter findings
of fact, conclusions of law, and an order of
dismissal. The dismissal and discharge do
not preclude the state from instituting a
subsequent prosecution for the same offense.

4
Note that Appellant's motion in the district court
seeks not only quashal of the bindover, but also dismissal of the
information (R. 58).
4

during the exercise of the court's original jurisdiction.

That

rule states,
(a) Upon the return of an indictment or
upon receipt of the records from the
magistrate following a bindover, the
defendant shall forthwith be arraigned in the
district court. Arraignment shall be
conducted in open court and shall consist of
reading the indictment or information to the
defendant or stating to him the substance of
the charge and calling on him to plead
thereto. He shall be given a copy of the
indictment or information before he is called
upon to plead.
(b) If upon arraignment the defendant
requests additional time in which to plead or
otherwise respond, a reasonable time may be
granted.
(c) Any defect or irregularity in or
want or absence of any proceeding provided
for by statute or these rules prior to
arraignment shall be specifically and
expressly objected to before a plea of guilty
is entered or the same is waived.
Tdl If defendant has been released on
bail, or on his own recognizance, prior to
arraignment and thereafter fails to appear
for arraignment or trial when required to do
so, a warrant of arrest may issue and bail
may be forfeited.
(emphasis added).
Both Rule 10 and Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure evidence legislative intent for district court
disposition of objections to inadequate showings of probable
cause at preliminary hearings during the course of the trial
court's exercise of original jurisdiction.
II.
EVEN IF BINDOVER QUASHAL IS
CONSIDERED STRICTLY AN APPELLATE FUNCTION,
THE DISTRICT COURTS MAY PERFORM IT.
In asserting that motions to quash bindovers are
5

subject to disposition solely in an appellate forum, the State
cites State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264, 279 (Utah 1985), and
notes that Utah Code Ann. section 77-35-26(2)(c) "governs
appeals from bindover orders of circuit courts and grants a
defendant the right to petition for an interlocutory appeal from
the order."

Respondent's brief at 4.

A close reading of Schreuder reveals that the Court was
not setting a mandatory appellate approach to motions to quash
bindovers, but was simply noting that Mr. Schreuder could not
raise an equal protection argument concerning the nature of
review his motion to quash received, because he had received the
benefit of review of his motion to quash in the supreme court.
The court stated:
The defendant raises an equal protection
argument related to the fact that his
preliminary examination was conducted in
district court rather than in circuit court,
claiming that he has been denied the right to
review of the bindover order by a superior
court, a right which is afforded to all adult
defendants whose preliminary hearings are
conducted in circuit rather than in district
court. We treat this argument summarily.
Section 77-35-26(b)(3) provides that an
appeal may be taken by the defendant "[f]rom
an interlocutory order when, upon petition
for review, the supreme court decides that
such an appeal would be in the interest of
justice...." That statute governs all
appeals from bindover orders entered in any
court. The defendant had the same right to
seek review as does any other criminal
defendant, and no equal protection problem
arises.

6

5
Id. at 270.
Assuming arguendo, but certainly not granting on the
merits, that bindover quashal is strictly an appellate function,
the district courts may perform it.
As noted repeatedly, this Court is vested with
appellate jurisdiction over the circuit courts.
section 78-2a-3(2)(d); 78-4-11.

Utah Code Ann.

How then, can it be that the

district court in this case might have exercised "appellate"
jurisdiction over the bindover order?
As explained in Van Dam v. Morris, 571 P.2d 1325 (Utah
1977), in conducting a preliminary hearing, the circuit court is
not acting as a circuit court, but is acting as a magistrate.
In the Van Dam case, the court was discussing the impropriety of
a city court dismissal of a class A Misdemeanor case under the
statutory scheme operant at that time.

The court explained,

A preliminary examination does not
invoke the jurisdiction of the court. In
such a proceeding, the action is not action
by a judge of any court, but that of a
magistrate, a distinct statutory office.
Justices of the Supreme Court, district
judges, city court judges, and justices of
the peace, when sitting as magistrates having
the jurisdiction and powers conferred by law
upon magistrates and not those that pertain
to their respective judicial offices.
Id. at 1327.
5
Appellant abandons the argument at pages 5 and 6 of
Appellant's opening brief concerning the precedential value of
the Brickey decision. As noted by the State at page 5, in
writing this argument, Appellate counsel, Elizabeth Holbrook,
failed to recognize the statute defining the appellate
jurisdiction of the district courts operant at the time the
Brickey decision was written. Appellate counsel regrets the error.
7

Regardless of which judge or justice sits as magistrate
over a preliminary hearing, it appears that the district court is
expected by the legislature to review the conduct and/or findings
of the magistrate when faced with an objection.

If this Court

wishes to characterize this review as "appellate", then Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure 10 and 12 provide the statutory
authorization of district court exercise of this "appellate"

.

....

6

jurisdiction.

III.
MOTIONS TO QUASH SHOULD BE
DISPOSED OF IN DISTRICT COURT.
The State contends that the remedy that Appellant was
limited to in this case was an interlocutory appeal to this
Court.

There are two reasons why this Court should not

interpret this Court's interlocutory appeal provision as the sole
remedy for objections to preliminary hearings: first, in so
doing, this Court might strip itself of the discretionary powers
of its interlocutory appeal process in these cases, and/or
second, in so doing, this Court might force district courts to
proceed through moot trials.
Before this Court accepts the State's invitation to
characterize a motion to quash a bindover as strictly an appeal,
this Court should note that Article VIII section 5 of the Utah
Constitution provides in part,
6
Article VIII section 5 of the Utah Constitution
indicates that the appellate jurisdiction of the district courts
is "as provided by statute".
7

Respondent's brief at 3.
8

Except for matters filed originally with the
supreme court, there shall be in all cases an
appeal of right from the court of original
jurisdiction to a court with appellate
jurisdiction over the cause.
By statute, however, interlocutory appeals to this
Court are discretionary, not mandatory.

Utah Court of Appeals

Rule 5; Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 26(2)(c).
If this Court were to find that district courts have no
jurisdiction over motions to quash bindovers, this Court might,
either by denying a petition for interlocutory appeal, or by
affirming the bindover order on an interlocutory appeal, force a
trial court through a moot trial.

While Appellant certainly

recognizes the dispatch and facility with which this Court
reviews records of cases in lower courts, Appellant submits that
a trial court presiding over a trial might gain, prior to or
during trial, insight unavailable to one facing a cold
transcript.

If this Court lacked the opportunity to gain this

insight during an interlocutory appeal, or declined to grant a
petition for interlocutory appeal, a trial court might thus be
forced through a moot trial.
Common sense and Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 10
and 12 counsel against such a waste of resources, and support
this Court's determination that district courts have jurisdiction
to quash defective bindover orders.
CONCLUSION
Appellant requests this Court to order the district
court to evaluate Appellant's motion to quash the bindover order
9

on the merits.
Respectfully submitted this (g± day of

yMJULL

1990.
JAMES C. BRADSHAW
Counsel for Appellant
//
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